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Abstract 
 Recently, academic discourse surrounding gender equality has included in it a discussion 
of how equity relates to political violence. With the recent upswing in political violence 
worldwide, it is necessary to continue to investigate the relationship between these two variables 
in order to better understand how to combat this trend. This study will add to the existing 
research on this topic by looking more specifically at the role women’s economic empowerment 
may play in reducing intrastate political violence. Statistical studies have found a negative 
relationship between gender equality, measured in economic terms, and intrastate political 
violence. By conducting an in-depth examination of the evolution of Basque political violence in 
Spain and the changing role of women in Spanish society this study attempts to more clearly 
determine the causal linkage between the two. The results suggest that while women’s economic 
empowerment, and gender equality more broadly, may not directly influence political violence 
via the reduction of material grievances, it is necessary for the development of a more liberal and 
inclusive democratic society that discourages the use of violence.   
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Introduction 
“As we look forward, I urge you to invest in gender equality and women’s empowerment not 
only as ends in themselves, but as critical means of achieving our overarching aim of preventing 
and ending conflict and building peace and prosperity in the world for all.” 
- UN Secretary General António Guterres, October 25, 20181 
What is the relationship between women’s economic empowerment and intrastate 
political violence? More broadly, how important is women’s empowerment as a security issue?  
Despite the rarity of modern interstate warfare intrastate political violence continues to 
persist. Notably, there has been a recent upward trend over the past several years.2 With it there 
has been increased discussion on its causes and possible solutions. One such discussion has 
centered on the role that gender equality may or may not play in mitigating the levels of 
violence.  
In 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1325, which for 
the first time emphasized the role that women need to play in peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention.3 Specifically, Resolution 1325 states that the full participation of women in 
peacebuilding and security efforts is essential to preventing the outbreak of conflict. Since then, 
the UNSC has passed seven more resolutions all together which comprise the UN’s Women, 
                                                 
1 António Guterres, “More Must Be Done in Support of Women’s Contributions to Peace, Secretary-General Tells 
Security Council, Outlining Gender-Parity Initiatives for United Nations,” United Nations, Meetings Coverage and 
Press Releases, October 25, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm19316.doc.htm  
2 Thomas S. Szayna, Stephen Watts, Angela O’Mahony, Bryan Frederick, and Jennifer Kavanagh, “What Are the 
Trends in Armed Conflicts, and What Do They Mean for US Defense Policy?” Rand Corporation, 2017, Accessed 
April 27, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1904.html 
3 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security, 
United Nations, October 2000, Accessed at http://www.un-documents.net/sr1325.htm.  
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Peace, and Security Agenda.4 These declarations suggest that gender inequality is not just a 
social justice issue, but a security one as well. 
Recent literature finds that increases in gender equality, measured across various 
indicators including female labor force participation, correspond to decreases in political 
violence across the world. These studies use large-n statistical regression analysis to corroborate 
their claims. What these studies lack, however, is a qualitative evaluation of the causal 
relationship between the two variables. This research will add to the ongoing discussion of 
gender equality and political violence by conducting an in-depth analysis of a singular country 
while testing two theoretical predictions.   
In the short term, women’s economic empowerment will reduce economic grievances 
that may generate political violence by increasing the level of household income. In the long 
term, increased gender equality in a society encourages and coincides with the development of 
democratic societies that condemn violence as a means to resolve political issues.   
This study begins by summarizing the theoretical literature on causes of political 
violence. It outlines the existing discourse on women and peace and how women’s economic 
empowerment is expected to reduce domestic political violence. Next, after selecting Spain as a 
country of analysis using a method of difference methodology, this paper analyzes the history of 
Spain from 1980 to 2017. It uses data on female to male labor force participation, human 
development measurements, and political violence counts to make an initial determination on the 
relationship between women’s economic empowerment and political violence. This paper then 
provides a historical overview of political violence, economic development, and the situation of 
women in Spain in order to subsequently analyze the nexus between the three. Finally, this paper 
                                                 
4 “The Resolutions,” PeaceWomen, Why Women, Peace and Security, Accessed January 15, 2018, 
http://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions  
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evaluates whether the events in Spain do or do not support the predictions of the theory and what 
the results imply for future research. 
Literature Review 
Causes of Political Violence 
Intrastate political violence is defined as non-state, politically-motivated violence that 
includes revolutions, civil wars, domestic terrorism, insurgencies, and guerrilla warfare.5 It does 
not include interstate war or crime and excludes state-sponsored or transnational terrorism. 
Hereinafter it will be referred to as political violence. 
In existing studies on gender equality and political conflict the conflict was measured as 
internal violence between citizens and their government, as well as terrorist acts by non-state 
actors at both a domestic and transnational level. Despite various operationalizations of gender 
equality and conflict the results are the same: an increased amount of gender equality 
corresponds with a decreased amount of conflict, measured as either internal political violence or 
as terrorism. The underpinnings of these studies do not differ at a theoretical level. That is, the 
same basic theoretical arguments are used to link gender equality (measured with various 
indicators) to different forms of political violence, whether they be terrorism, civil wars, 
insurgencies, etc.  
This study only focuses on intrastate forms of political violence as gender equality, and 
women’s economic empowerment specifically, is a domestic-level variable. It would not be 
useful nor reasonable to use the domestic policies of one state to evaluate the emergence of 
political violence in another.  
                                                 
5 Based on the definition provided by Patrick H. O’Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 6th edition. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), 208.  
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The various cited causes of political violence describe how individuals and groups 
respond to perceived grievances regarding various economic, political, or social conditions. 
These include the level of economic and human development, the type of political institutions, 
the degree of political stability, and the level of cultural modernization.  
 Although various forms of political violence have different reported causes, aggregated 
together the causes all fall within the same broad economic, political, or social categories.  
 
Economic Development 
The degree of economic development in a society may create grievances that in turn may 
generate political violence. Traditional explanations of political violence claim that individuals 
who lack the means to obtain necessary economic and material needs are more likely to use 
radical or violent actions to obtain them.6 In other words, individuals who live on lower incomes 
or below the poverty level are more likely to engage in internal political violence as a means to 
protest and improve their situation. This is linked to the idea of relative deprivation, which 
argues that perceived inequalities within a society generate violence.7 The implication, therefore, 
is that economic growth can help alleviate the number of political violence incidents in a 
country.8 
At a causal level, poverty can help terrorist or insurgent groups generate support in the 
societies where they function by giving them a cause around which people can rally.9 Poverty 
                                                 
6 James A. Piazza, “Poverty is a Weak Causal link,” in Debating terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting 
Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, ed. Stuart Gottlieb, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010) 37-38.  
7 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).  
8 One study found this to be true for domestic and international terrorism, but not suicide terrorism (see Seung-Whan 
Choi, “Economic Growth and Terrorism: Domestic, International, and Suicide,” Oxford Economic Papers, (2015): 
157-181 at 172).  
9 Karin von Hippel, “Poverty is an Important Cause,” in Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting 
Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, ed. Stuart Gottlieb, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 61.  
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can also incentivize participation in cases where terrorist or insurgent groups offer financial 
compensation to families whose members volunteer to become suicide bombers.10 Additionally, 
some terrorist groups have offered needed social services and protection in poor regions lacking, 
for one reason or another, parallel government support.11  
Globalization can also create economic grievances that may motivate political violence. 
Globalization introduces changes to countries via economic integration, new foreign policies, 
and alliance structures.12 These changes have the potential to generate relative deprivation 
grievances among particular groups in societies due to resulting increases in economic 
inequalities and social polarizations.13 Increased inequalities may lead to demands for political 
change, which depending on regime type, may or may not encourage terrorism.14  
Conversely, many scholars have empirically disproved economic factors as a direct cause 
of political violence.15 Many countries with political violence have little socio-economic 
similarities.16 Political violence occurs in both low- and high-income countries, which reduces 
the credibility of poverty as a causal factor. Furthermore, many terrorists come from educated, 
middle-class backgrounds rather than from a low-income stratum, as the poverty-terrorism 
relationship would predict.17 These claims are further validated by regression analyses that show 
                                                 
10 Hippel., 58.  
11 Hippel, 55, 61. 
12 Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks, “What Causes terrorism?” Public Choice 147, (2011): 3-27 at 8.  
13 Antanas Gotchev, “Terrorism and Globalization,” in The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) 105-106; Kristopher Robinson, Martha Crenshaw, and J. Craig Jenkins, “Ideologies of Violence: 
the Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist transnational terrorism,” Social Forces, 84(4), (2006):2009–2026; Samuel 
R. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press:1966); Samuel R. 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (Simon & Schuster: 1998). 
14 Gotchev, 106.  
15 Krieger and Meierrieks, 10; Piazza, 38; Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of 
Terrorism,” The American Economic Review, 96(2), (May 2006): 50-56 at 55-56;  
16 Piazza, 46-47.  
17 Piazza, 48-49. 
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how economic growth has no significant impact on terrorism.18 That said, economic growth may 
still play an indirect role in promoting internal political violence by creating conditions that may 
facilitate its emergence.19 
 
Political Institutions and Stability 
There is no clear consensus on the impact of political institutions.20 On one hand, some 
findings show that liberal democracies are less likely to produce political violence as they can 
provide nonviolent channels to express dissent.21 By allowing its constituents to participate in the 
political process democracies make their citizens feel like they have vested interest in the 
institution.22 Additionally, democratic political designs hold politicians accountable to their 
people. Politicians are more likely to address adverse social conditions that may generate 
grievances that trigger terrorism in order to be re-elected.23 
Having said that, democracies also tend to be more ethnically diverse. Some argue that 
states with higher levels of ethnic diversity may be more susceptible to political violence.24 One 
                                                 
18 Krieger and Meierrieks, 9-10; see also Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: 
is there a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), (2003): 119–144; Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 
Mogens K. Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen, “The Political Economy of Freedom, Democracy and Transnational 
Terrorism,” Public Choice, 128, (2006): 289–315; Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, “The Friend of my Enemy 
is my Enemy: International Alliances and International Terrorism,” European Journal of Political Research, 49(1), 
(2010): 75–96; Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin, “Kto kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and 
Targets of Terrorism,” in Terrorism, economic development, and political openness, eds. P. Keefer and N.Loayza, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press: 2008); Andreas Freytag, Jens J. Krüger, Daniel Meierrieks, & Friedrich 
Schneider, “The Origins of Terrorism: Cross-country Estimates on Socio-economic Determinants of Terrorism” CIE 
Working Paper 2009-01 (University of Paderborn: 2008). 
19 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 13(4), (July 1981): 379-399 at 382.  
20 Krieger and Meierrieks, 7.  
21 Jian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model,” Journal of Political 
Research, 30(3), (1993): 317-329; William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Does Democracy Encourage 
Terrorism?” Terrorism and Political Violence, 6(4), (1994): 417-435 at 417; Gregory Cause III, “Can Democracy 
Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs, 84(5), (Sep. – Oct. 2005): 62-76.  
22 O’Neil, 228.  
23 Burcu Savun and Brian J. Phillips, “Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
53(6), (December 2009): 878-904 at 881.  
24 Leonard Weinberg, “Democracy and Terrorism,” in The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) 46-47.  
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study found that democracies are more likely to encourage transnational terrorism specifically, as 
they are more likely to be involved in international politics that may create foreign resentment 
and therefore be the targets of transnational terrorism.25  
Authoritarian regimes on the other hand, are better able to quell dissent and any ensuing 
internal political violence through means of harsh repression.26  That said, they are more likely to 
generate grievances associated with political disenfranchisement that in turn may trigger political 
violence.27 28 By failing to provide political means of dissent, such as the legalization of political 
opposition groups, authoritarian regimes ultimately are more likely to see higher rates of political 
violence.29  
Most significantly, the degree of political stability in a country may impact the likelihood 
of political violence. Countries in political transition are relatively more likely to experience 
political violence than consolidated democracies or authoritarian regimes.30 Accordingly, when a 
country is experiencing regime transition or contention the probability of political violence 
within the state is increased.31 
  
                                                 
25 Savun and Phillips, 878. 
26 Quan Li, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 49(2). (2005): 278-297; Eubank and Weinberg; Brian Lai, “Draining the Swamp: An Empirical 
Examination of the Production of International Terrorism, 1968-1998,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 
24(4), (2007): 297-310.  
27 Ibid.  
28 This is a probabilistic statement, not a deterministic one. There are cases that seem to be outliers to this 
observation, such as China, Singapore, and Vietnam. Explanations as to why are not relevant to this study.   
29 Deniz Aksoy, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright, “Terrorism in Dictatorships,” The Journal of Politics, 74(3), 
(July 2012): 810-826 at 813.  
30 Abadie, 55-56.  
31 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Ruud Koopmans, “The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West 
Germany, 1965 to 1989,” American Sociological Review, 58 (1993): 637-658; Christian Davenport, David A. 
Armstrong, and Mark I. Lichbach, “Conflict Escalation and the Origins of Civil War,” 2004, 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Christian_Davenport/publication/228678666_Conflict_Escalation_and_the_Ori
gins_of_Civil_War/links/0046351f2233162a72000000.pdf 
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Cultural Modernization and Human Development 
Cultural modernization occurs when social institutions and practices shift away from 
traditional identities to more modern ones.32 This cultural shift puts more emphasis on secularism 
and rational-bureaucratic thinking, rather than on religious or traditional knowledge.33 Especially 
in the case of religiously and ethnically motivated violence, cultural identities strongly rooted in 
an adherence to certain religious or cultural beliefs are more likely to perceive a social or cultural 
outgroup as a threat.35 Politically violent groups can recruit support by building on identity-
related ideologies that appeal to a certain ethnic, cultural or religious group.36 As such, countries 
that have culturally modernized and consequently uphold tolerance, diversity and individual 
expression would be less likely to generate political violence. Interestingly, research shows that 
many grievances that are connected to modernization are generated during the transition period 
in which the society moves from a traditional to a modern society.37 
Cultural modernization is linked to socioeconomic changes.38 As societies shift from 
industrial to post-industrial economic models there is an increase in self-expression values 
among the populace. This in turn leads to demands for political freedoms. A society that legally 
protects individual choice sees cultural changes in which individual difference is respected rather 
than persecuted.39 Such changes include shifts in gender roles, sexual norms, family values, 
                                                 
32 Kristopher K. Robinson, “Unpacking the Social Origins of Terrorism: The Role of Women’s Empowerment in 
Reducing Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33, (2010): 735-756 at 739-740.  
33 Robinson, 740; Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures of Weber, ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2004).  
35 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism, 32, (2009): 537-559 at 537.  
36 Krieger and Meierrieks, 8.  
37 Ross (1993).   
38 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-4.  
39 Ibid.   
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religion, communal activities, or political participation.40 Although modernization may begin at a 
socioeconomic level, it has a unique impact on the culture and norms of the impacted country.41   
For this reason, various organization such as the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) have developed indexes that aggregate socio-economic factors in order to produce a 
more comprehensive picture of the level of development in a country. One such index is the 
Human Development Index (HDI), which aggregates country-level measures of longevity (life 
expectancy at birth), education (expected and mean years of schooling) and standard of living 
(GNI per capita) to produce a more comprehensive measure of development.42 Findings suggest 
that low HDI is necessary to ensure political stability, though the same does not hold for high 
HDI.43 
 
Existing Theories on Women and Violence 
There are two broad theories that have been used to explain why empowered women 
would mitigate levels of violence within a society. The first is based on biological explanations, 
and the second, on sociological ones.  
 Biological explanations are rooted in evolutionary psychology and contend that 
evolutionary pressures caused women to be less violent than men.44 The result is that males 
today are more prone to aggressiveness, competitiveness and risk-taking behavior as a result of a 
                                                 
40 Inglehart and Welzel, 3-4.  
41 For a more detailed and comprehensive discussion of development and freedom, see Amartya Sen Development 
as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001). 
42 UNDP, “Human Development Index (HDI), Accessed at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi  
43 Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição, “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict, and Human Development,” Journal 
of Peace Studies, 15(1), (Spring/Summer 2010): 29-43 at 34. For findings on education and conflict, see Paul 
Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mås Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 
(2004): 253-273.  
44 Robinson, 737.  
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natural selection that forced males to compete for scarce resources, relative power, and females 
(mates).45 The more aggressive and violent males tended to win this competition for survival and 
consequently passed on their behavioral tendencies to their offspring. This genetic propensity 
among males to be violent makes them more likely to engage in culturally available roles that 
favor the use of force as a form of conflict resolution, as is the case with politically-motivated 
violence.46 It should be noted that although natural selection favored male characteristics of 
violence and strength, it does not follow that all males are subsequently violent, or that violent 
patriarchal social structures are inevitable to the human condition.47 
 Sociological explanations, on the other hand, do not place the burden of male tendencies 
towards violence on biology, but rather on socialization due to patriarchal legacies. The position 
and role of most women in society is based on their role as the primary family caretakers.48 As a 
result, women will not engage in violent activities that could potentially inflict harm on their 
charges.49 Men, conversely, are less constrained by their role in society. Furthermore, since men 
marry at an older age, they have a longer period of time in their life in which they are not 
constrained by familial obligations.50 The implication is that young men will have less 
responsibilities holding them back from participating in political violence.51 This claim is based 
                                                 
45 Robinson, 737. 
46 Ibid.   
47 Evolutionary theorists argue that male-dominated social hierarchies were selected for in human evolution because 
they were best able to maximize group survival. This is because evolutionary reproductive pressures selected for 
male physical strength. The stronger the males, the better they could protect the group. It also follows that the social 
hierarchies that formed served to protect the reproductive interests of ingroup males against outgroup males by 
enabling “alpha” males to dominate both subordinate ingroup males and outgroup males, as well as control sexual 
access to females (see Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett, Sex and 
World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 14). 
48 Many authors argue that this is due to an entrenched system patriarchy as a result of evolutionary pressures that 
favored male dominated social structures (see Hudson et al., (2012)) 
49 Robinson, 737.  
50 Ibid., 737 
51 An argument has been made that religiously motivated terrorism, in which the participants tend to be men, is in 
part fueled by a perception of sexual failure by part of the terrorist. These failures are connected to the traditional 
roles assigned to the male gender by their respective culture, that when unfulfilled, can lead to a participation in 
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on the argument that socialization in patriarchal societies promotes ‘hegemonic masculinity’, or 
cultural practices and institutions which elevate more aggressive and dominant male 
characteristics.52 In these societies, social learning models teach patriarchal norms of violence to 
younger boys, who in turn teach them to their progeny.53 Consequently terrorists and other 
individuals that partake in political violence, the majority of them being men, may resolve their 
political disputes using violence, an action they see as appropriate for their male gender.54 
It is problematic, however, to make the blanket claim that all women are peaceful, and all 
men are violent. Although natural selection favored male characteristics of physical aggression 
and strength, it does not follow that all males are subsequently violent, or that violent patriarchal 
social structures are inevitable to the human condition.55 In fact, contemporary examples 
contradict this very notion. Women are capable of, and do commit violence, just as men have 
been seen to lead peace movements56. Additionally, it has been shown that there is no significant 
correlation between the presence of female executives and lower levels of intrastate conflict.57 
That said, a more aggressive or bellicose female executive could merely be behaving in a 
                                                 
terrorism as a form of symbolic empowerment (see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global 
Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003) at 199).  
52 Raewyn Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 
53 Hudson et al. (2012), 23-24. 
54 Aneela Salman, “Green Houses for Terrorism: Measuring the Impact of Gender Equality and Outcomes as 
Deterrents of Terrorism,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 39(4), (2015): 281-
306 at 284; see also Allan G. Johnson, “Patriarchy,” in Race, class, and gender in the United States, 8th ed., ed. P. S. 
Rothenberg, (New York, NY: Work, 2010): 153-161. 
55 Hudson et al. (2012), 16-17.  
56 The rise and prevalence of female terrorists contradicts the notion that all women are violence-averse. That said, 
various authors in the literature have debated whether the pull and push factors that compel women to join terrorist 
organizations differ from those of men. Interestingly, one scholar found that female terrorists tend to be a part of 
groups motivated by political or secular ideology, rather than a religious one. More specifically, the more radically 
religious a terrorist group is, the less likely women are to participate in it (see Juergensmeyer, 199-200). 
Additionally, well-known historical figures such as Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr. provide examples of 
scenarios in which male figures used peaceful methods, rather than violent ones, to resolve societal grievances.  
57 Melander, 704-711.  
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stereotypically masculine way in order combat the stereotypes of weakness that are associated 
with women making decisions about economics or national security.58  
 
Women’s Economic Empowerment and Political Violence 
Studies have found that the level of gender equality in a state is negatively related to 
political violence.59 The broad theoretical explanation is that high levels of gender inequality in a 
society are indicative of a culture that is more likely to use violence to address grievances as a 
form of conflict resolution.  
Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of looking at political violence as a 
social phenomenon born of grievances resulting from social contexts and the relationship 
between governments and their citizens.60 Through the use of violence, the perpetrators of 
political violence acquire tangible or intangible goods that are social and symbolic in nature.61 
Socio-psychological explanations of political violence argue that a group’s frustration towards 
negative stimuli can result in aggression, which can take the form of violence.62 Within the 
frustration-aggression theory lies the theory of relative deprivation, which argues that perceived 
inequalities within a society generate violence.63 When individuals within a society see 
themselves as having less than they think they should, they resort to violence in order to change 
                                                 
58 Salman, 285; Deborah Alexander and Kristi Anderson, “Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership 
Traits,” Political Research Quarterly, 46(3), (1993): 527-545; Patricia Lee Sykes, “Women as National Leaders: 
Patterns and Prospects,” Sage Focus Editions, 153, (1993): 219-229.  
59 Mary Caprioli, “Gendered Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 37(1), (Jan. 2000): 51-68; Mary Caprioli, 
“Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict,” International Studies 
Quarterly, 49, (2005): 161-178; Erik Melander, “Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict,” International 
Studies Quarterly, 49(4), (Dec., 2005): 695-714; Hudson et al. (2012); Salman (2015). 
60 Crenshaw (1981); Edward Newman, “Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 29, (2006): 749-772; Robinson, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006); Robinson (2015).  
61 Robinson, 735. According to Robinson, an example of these goods are rights afforded by a government to its 
people.  
62 John Dollard, Neal E. Miller, Leonard W. Doob, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, Frustration and Aggression 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939), 1. See also, Leonard Berkowitz, Roots of Aggression, A Re-
Examination of Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).  
63 Gurr (1970).  
 Walker 15 
their situation.64 These inequalities are many times generated by socioeconomic changes that 
create broad disparities within societal groups. Violence is used by the disadvantaged groups to 
ameliorate their situation. That said, not all situations of relative deprivation result in violence.65 
It is therefore important to look at specific social factors that would encourage and validate the 
use of violence as a means of addressing grievances. 
Various studies have argued that domestic culture is an important predictor of a state’s 
likelihood of political violence.66 Many specifically examined the role that gender inequality and 
the culture surrounding it play in predicting the prevalence of political violence. This type of 
social discrimination tends to be embedded in religious and cultural norms that shape how 
individuals in society interact with one another.  Overall, the literature has found there to be a 
negative relationship between gender equality and political violence.67  
The existing research on gender equality and political violence has looked at various 
measurements of equity. These include the percentage of women in parliament, female 
workforce participation, fertility rates, the existence of a female executive leader, the number of 
                                                 
64 Gurr (1970).  
65 The relative deprivation theory has most commonly been applied to economic causes of terrorism. Specifically, 
the poverty-terrorism theory argues that individuals who lack the means to obtain necessary economic and material 
needs are more likely to use radical or violent actions to obtain them. Research, however, seems to refute this 
linkage (see Krieger and Meierricks, 10; Piazza, 37-38, 46-49).   
66 Ali A. Mazuri, Cultural Forces in World Politics, (Oxford: James Currey, 1990); Errol A. Henderson, “Culture or 
Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 41(5), (1997): 649-668; Ted R. Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing 
World System: 1994 Presidential Address,” International Studies Quarterly, 38, (1994): 347-377; Stephen M. 
Saideman, “Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties,” 
International Organization, 51(4): 721-753; R. William Ayres, “A World Flying Apart? Violent Nationalist Conflict 
and the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Peace Research, 37(4), (1997): 105-117; Tanja Ellingson, “Colorful 
Community or Ethnic Witches Brew?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), (2000): 2280-249; Jonathan Fox, 
“Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts,” International Politics, 38(4), (2001): 515-532; 
Caprioli (2005); Robinson (2010); Salman (2015).  
67 This study looks at terrorism. Other studies have looked at gender equality and interstate conflict, and also found a 
negative relationship between the two variables (See Caprioli (2000); Mary Caprioli, “Gender Equality and State 
Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality on State First Use of Force,” International Interactions, 
29(3), (2003): 195-214; Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. 
Emmett, “The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States,” International Security, 
33(3), (Winter 2008/2009): 7-45; Robinson, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006)).   
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years of education acquired by women over 25, and the female-to-male higher education 
attainment ratio. More generally, these studies use various operationalizations of gender equality, 
under political, economic, and social dimensions.  
This thesis will look at women’s economic empowerment, rather than other indicators of 
gender equality, as women’s economic empowerment more effectively measures the public 
participation of women in society. Women’s economic empowerment is a broad term that refers 
not just to the number of women working in the formal economic sector, but also to the ability of 
women to hold property, run a business, make independent financial decisions, retain earnings, 
gain the necessary skills to work in a competitive global market, and to be self-reliant.68 
Women’s economic empowerment better reflects a broader form of material and social 
empowerment than do other indicators, such as political participation.69 Political participation is 
limited in its scope in that it tends to only focus on a small demographic, such as an elite group 
of women, rather than women across the society.70 Education measures are also limited in that 
they measure potential, rather than actual, women’s participation in their society.71 Finally, 
measures looking at polygyny rates, while indicative, would limit the data pool to only those 
countries in which polygyny is practiced. 72    
                                                 
68 For more on women’s empowerment, see UN Women and UN Global Compact Office, Women’s Empowerment 
Principles, Equality Means Business, 2nd ed. (2011) http://www.unwomen.org/-
/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2011/10/women-s-empowerment-
principles_en%20pdf.pdf?la=en&vs=1504). 
69 Robinson, 741.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid.  
72 The theory is that polygyny increases the number of unmarried, low-status, young males in a society, which then 
increases levels of societal violence. This is because in polygynous societies single women are more likely to be 
married off to wealthier, older males, who accumulate various wives. This in turn creates a scarcity of mates for low 
status, young unmarried males. Given that these non-alpha males are likely to see reproductive failure, they become 
prime candidates for social unrest. These young unmarried men are statistically prone to violence. This is explained 
in part by higher baseline levels of testosterone in young males, who if unmarried, are more likely to turn to 
violence. Additionally, these unmarried males may have a greater incentive to seek social status and dominance 
through violent means, in the hopes of acquiring enough resources needed to attract sexual partners. (Caprioli 
(2005), 162; Bradley A. Thayer and Valerie M. Hudson, “Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on 
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At a quantitative level, women’s economic empowerment can be operationalized using 
indicators such as the percentage of women that make up the formal labor force, the income gap 
between men and women, and the amount of years of female education.73 At a qualitative level, 
it can be looked at in terms of existing policies and protections that allow women to participate 
in the formal economy while retaining earnings.74  
 
Theory 
Women’s economic empowerment participation may reduce political violence by 
changing the material conditions that are associated with an increase in political violence. As 
more women join the labor force, the amount of income in a given household will increase, 
which may in turn mitigate material conditions (i.e. poverty or wealth inequality) that generate 
economic grievances.75 Economic grievances may increase the likelihood of political violence, 
particularly in societies where violence is a more common method of conflict resolution.76  
Normative changes can also follow changes in material conditions. Patriarchal societies 
tend to be those which are dominated by male values promoting dominance and aggression. As 
the number of women in the labor force increases, however, there is an eventual change in 
norms, institutions, and power relations as they affect the status of women.77 Greater female 
                                                 
Islamic Suicide Terrorism,” International Security 34(4), (Spring 2010): 37-62 at 44, 48; Richard Dawkins, 
“Wealth, Polygyny, and Reproductive Success,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9(1), (1986): 190-191 at 190; 
Frederic L. Pryor, “Simulation of the Impact of Social and Economic Institutions on the Size Distribution of Income 
and Wealth,” American Economic Review, 63(1), (1973): 50-72 at 50; Rose McDermott and Jonathan Cowden, 
“Polygyny and Violence against Women,” Emory Law Journal 64(6), (2015), 1769- 1809 at 1780).  
73 The amount of education, or human capital, a woman has is related to the skillset she has that allows her to work 
in the formal economy. This is more of an indirect indicator of women’s economic empowerment. (see Annika 
Törnqvist and Catharina Schmitz, “Women’s Economic Empowerment: Scope for Sida’s Engagement,” Sida 
Working Paper, December 30, 2009, 6-10).  
74 Ibid.  
75 Robinson, 738.  
76 Von Hippel, 61; Choi, 172.  
77 Joshua Eastin and Askeem Prakash, “Economic Development and Gender Equality,” World Politics, 65(1), (Jan. 
2013): 156-86 at 161.  
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economic power leads to greater female social visibility and human capital development. Such 
changes encourage the establishment of new institutions and norms that replace those espousing 
cultural, social, and legal discrimination.78 Women’s economic empowerment also leads to 
women’s empowerment in other areas, such as in the political or domestic sphere.79 The result is 
a society in which traditional gender roles and norms are replaced by new ones embracing 
gender equality and broader egalitarianism. The normative gender shift is implicitly 
accompanied by broader liberal norms of equality in which diversity is tolerated and protected.80 
Broader norms of equality reduce the likelihood of political violence. 
 
Hypothesis 1: More women in the labor force will increase household incomes and reduce 
economic grievances that may lead to political violence. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As women become economically empowered there is an overall increase in gender 
equality attitudes in society, which coincides with a broader culturally-liberal shift in which 
diversity is respected and conflict is resolved democratically.  
 
Considering Endogeneity 
There is reason to believe that the correlation between women’s empowerment and 
political violence is in fact a larger function of other economic, political, or social phenomena. 
The existing literature suggests that gender equality may have resulted from economic 
development, specifically industrialization and post industrialization. Women in industrially 
                                                 
78 Eastin and Prakash, 166.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Inglehart and Welzel, 3-4.  
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advanced societies see higher levels of gender equality, as they are able to earn a living 
independent of husbands, fathers, or other males.81 Today, many of the world’s leading 
democracies, all of which went through an industrialization phase, are also champions of 
women’s equality. Therefore, it is plausible that any negative relationship between female 
economic empowerment and political violence is actually explained by poorer social contexts 
where women do not work in the formal economy or are not economic empowered.82 A country 
with more economically independent women may also be a wealthier country in which 
grievances are less likely to be generated due to poor economic conditions.  
Economic development can be proxied using indicators such as GDP per capita, and the 
relative weight of agricultural versus manufacturing versus service sectors as part of GDP. These 
are good proxies for two reasons.  
First, increased female economic empowerment may indicate a larger middle class where 
a larger proportion of households have dual incomes. A larger overall income per household 
could be indicative of a society in which there is less likelihood of poor economic conditions that 
may generate grievances that could lead to political violence.83  
Second, manufacturing-heavy economies, which are male-dominated, are more likely to 
unionize. Prevalent unionization increases the possibility of organized protest that may lead to 
terrorism.84 Conversely service-heavy economies, which tend to be labeled as advanced 
economies, are less prone to unionization and its potential risks. Women are also more likely to 
work in services than they are in manufacturing. A correlation between female labor force 
                                                 
81 Marvin Harris, “The Evolution of Human Gender Hierarchies: A Trial Formulation,” in Sex and Gender 
Hierarchies, ed. Barbara Diane Miller,  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57-79 at 75.   
82 Robinson, 741.  
83 Robinson, 738.  
84 Robinson, 738, 742.  
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participation and political violence may thus be explained by more the existence of an advanced 
economy, or an economy with a relatively larger service sector.85  
It is also reasonable to think that any connection between female labor force participation 
and political violence is actually the result of broader political liberalism. Societies in which 
women have increased female labor force participation may also be societies in which women, as 
well as any marginalized or minority group, are granted widespread civil and political liberties. 
This would limit the possibility of political violence as a response to repression.86 Thus a 
negative correlation between gender equality and political violence could actually be explained 
by the level of civil or political liberties in a society. 
 As mentioned in the literature, countries in political transition are more likely than 
consolidated democracies or authoritarian regimes to see political violence. The level of political 
or civil liberties in a country should be taken in to account along with a measure of political 
dissent within the society, in order to account for regime transition. 
Finally, female labor force participation could be but one measure of a larger cultural 
modernization in which an increased emphasis on self-expression reduces the likelihood of 
terrorism by changing the way in which individual differences are addressed. In other words, a 
society that has modernized to the point of economically empowering women may also be a 
society in which traditional norms, including those pertaining to gender roles, have shifted 
enough to allow for broader acceptance of differing identities that in the past may have triggered 
                                                 
85 Robinson, 739, 742.   
86 Robinson, 739.  
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conflict.87 In fact, women’s labor force participation has been used as a measure of 
modernization, along with other variables.88 
 Cultural modernization can be proxied using measures of atheism and urbanization.89 
Using atheism as a cultural modernization indicator assumes that atheism is a modern belief and 
that therefore societies with higher numbers of atheists in their populations are also more modern 
societies.90 Likewise, high rates of urbanism in a country are assumed to represent more modern 
and secular lifestyles.91  
Methods and Research Design 
Various statistical studies show that female labor force participation has a negative and 
independent effect on different types of political violence, such as terrorism or civil war.92 This 
finding holds when controlling for other possible causes of political violence, such as regime 
type, economic development, regime transition, or cultural modernization. These statistical 
studies conducted large-n, negative binomial and logistical regression analyses to determine the 
effect of gender equality on political violence. 93 By having a large number of independent 
observations, the studies are able to find a negative correlation between female labor force 
participation and political violence that can be more plausibly generalized.  
                                                 
87 A similar argument is made by Robinson, 740. 
88 Daniel Stockemer and Askel Sundström, “Modernization Theory: How to Measure and Operationalize it When 
Gauging Variation in Women’s Representation,” Social Indicators Research, 125(2), (Jan. 2016): 695-712 at 695.  
89 Robinson, 742.  
90 Robison, 742.   
91 Robinson, 742.  
92 Caprioli (2005); Melander (2005); Robinson (2010); Salman (2015). 
93 Each author measures gender equality using different indicators. Caprioli uses fertility rates and female labor 
force participation, Melander uses percent of women in parliament, Robinson uses female labor force participation, 
and Salman uses average years of female educated for ages 25+, female labor force participation, percent of women 
in parliament, and measures of government and institutional support for women’s rights.  
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Do these results hold up in specific case study contexts? In other words, do efforts to 
economically empower women in a particular country with a history of political violence reduce 
political violence in the ways articulated by the above theory? Or are there other factors, such as 
development or political stability that are necessary for women’s economic empowerment to 
have a mitigating effect on political violence?  
Thus far there have not been many empirical case studies testing whether this causal 
relationship holds at a qualitative level. Qualitative analysis, however, includes the use of 
plausibility probes to determine not just whether women’s economic empowerment reduces 
political violence in a particular country, but the way in which it would do so. This process is 
important to investigate given that existing statistical studies fail to specifically outline or predict 
the causal mechanisms that would connect these two variables.  
Furthermore, a case study in one country could more easily look at regional differences 
that might contribute to political violence (i.e. horizontal inequalities), rather than rely on 
aggregate national indicators that might skew the data and not reveal relative deprivation 
inequalities within a country that may drive conflict.94   
 
Country Selection 
To qualitatively test the implications of the theory this study selected a country in which 
gender equality, measured using the female-to-male labor force participation ratio (FMLPR) for 
each country, and human development, measured using values from the Human Development 
Index (HDI), changed differently from one another from 1990 to 2017.95 FMLFPR is used as an 
                                                 
94 This observation was made in a similar study, Gudrun Ostby, Regnihild Nordas, and Jan Ketil Rod, “Regional 
Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,” International Studies Quarterly, 53(2), (June 2009): 301-
324.  
95 This time period is decided by the availability of data published by the World Bank for FMLFPR, and the United 
Nations Development Program for HDI.   
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indicator of women’s economic empowerment, while HDI is an indicator for economic and 
human development, another cited cause of political violence.   
The absolute values for both FMLFPR and HDI are converted into global percentiles in 
order to compare the two independent variables across countries. The percentile rank for each 
country’s FMLFPR and HDI is calculated using a method of difference procedure in which the 
global percentile values in 1990 are subtracted from those in 2017. The result reflects how much 
each country has changed in terms of women’s economic empowerment and human development 
relative to other countries.  
The purpose of such a procedure is to find a country in which the effects of FMLFPR and 
HDI can be isolated from one another, in order to avoid the issue of collinearity. Effects can be 
isolated when a change in one independent variable does not correlate with a change in the other. 
In practice, this is seen when either a country has a large positive change in one independent 
variable and a large negative in the other, or when a country has a large positive or negative 
change in one independent variable and little to no change in the other. The global results are 
displayed in the case study prediction box below.  
 
Independent Variable 1: Female to Male Labor Force Participation Ratio 
As previously discussed, female labor force participation is one of the many indicators 
that can be used to measure women’s economic empowerment. Although there are other 
indicators that may be more accurate in measuring women’s economic empowerment, they are 
not as widely available in terms of data as is female labor force participation. In order to compare 
the largest number of countries and consequently choose one to study in depth, it is thus 
necessary to use the most widely available set of data, i.e. female labor force participation. 
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Moreover, participation in the formal labor force is an important first step in broader women’s 
economic empowerment.96  
That said, absolute female labor force participation does not capture the relative nature of 
gender equality vis-à-vis how the status of women compares to that of men. The data used in this 
thesis as the first independent variable is, therefore, a ratio of female to male labor force 
participation (FMLFPR). FMLFPR is calculated by dividing female labor force participation by 
male labor force participation and multiplying the result by one hundred (FMLFPR is a percent 
value). Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population that is economically 
active and above the age of 15 and is derived from the World Bank database.97  
 
Independent Variable 2: Human Development Index (HDI) 
The HDI, developed by the UNDP, is an aggregate measure of development that accounts for 
economic as well as social dimensions of development.98 It is scored on a scale of 0 to 1, with 
lower values indicating lower HDI scores and higher values indicating higher HDI scores.  
The UNDP has also developed more specific measures of human development that account 
for gender disparities, inequality, and poverty such as the Gender Development Index (GDI) and 
the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index. Such indices, however, are not analytically 
useful for this study as available data only extends as far back as 1995 and 2010, respectively.99  
  
                                                 
96 Eastin and Prakash, 166.  
97 ‘Economically active’ refers to any person who supplies labor for the production of goods and services.  
98 The HDI does not reflect inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc. While these values would be 
more useful, they are limited due to their recent implementation and therefore would reduce the number of years 
studied.  
99 Although not possible due to data availability, it would have been useful to gender-disaggregate HDI and then run 
a correlation analysis between FMLFPR and male-only HDI. If it turned out that the correlation between male-only 
HDI and FMLFPR is lower than the correlation between the combined HDI and FMLFPR, then it would have 
reduced the extent to which HDI and FMLFPR are measuring the same thing.  
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A Note on Correlations between Gender Equality and Human Development 
 Correlations between changes in FMLFPR and HDI 2017-1990 are near zero. This is 
counterintuitive, given that the literature finds that overall gender equality and economic growth 
have a positive relationship. That said, this relationship is not linear, which may in part explain 
the correlation discrepancy.  
One study, using data spanning from 1970 to 1992, calculated a correlation coefficient of 
0.8 between Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
over a sample of 130 countries.100 Another study found that while there was an overall positive 
relationship between GDI and GDP, this relationship follows an S-curve. At low levels of GDP 
GDI increases are low, while at higher levels of GDP GDI increases are relatively much 
larger.101 A third study found that the effects of economic development on gender equality, 
measured using various indicators such as GDI and female labor force participation, are 
dependent on the degree of development.102 At low and high levels of development, measured as 
GDP per capita, gender equality increases. At middle levels of development, however, gender 
equality decreases or plateaus. As development continues to rise, it becomes necessary for states 
to implement legislative reforms supporting gender equality in order for it to continue 
increasing.103 
  Additionally, it may be that the nature of development in the countries with the highest 
HDI improvements does not include actual improvements in economic gender equality, 
specifically female workforce participation. 104 They may also be countries in which 
                                                 
100 Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, “Gender Equality and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth, 8, (203): 403-426.  
101 A. Geske Dijkstra and Lucia C. Hammer, “Measuring Socio-Economic Gender Inequality: Toward an Alternative 
to the UNDP Gender-Related Development Index,” Feminist Economics, 6(2), (2000): 41-75 at 48.  
102 Eastin and Prakash, 156.  
103 Ibid.  
104 Rwanda, China, Mozambique, Iran, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia. Data for this is not included in 
this paper but is part of the large data analysis used to construct the prediction box.  
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development occurred very quickly, hence the large change, but did not coincide with actual 
improvements in gender equality due to legislative or cultural barriers.105 If one of the major 
barriers to gender equality is culture, then perhaps in those countries there is a cultural 
component that discourages female labor force participation, which may therefore explain the 
anomalous correlation. This is speculative, however, as an in-depth analysis of those countries 
falls outside the realm of this study. 
 Moreover, HDI does not account for gender disparities within countries as it is an 
aggregate measure of national longevity, average years of education, and GNI. Increases in HDI, 
accordingly, may not necessarily correlate with increases in FMLFPR. Female-to-male labor 
force participation is also in itself a limited measurement of gender equality, as it only captures 
raw participation of women in the society but does not factor in raw income or types of labor, 
which are factors included in development measurements.  
 Despite this correlation anomaly it is still useful to use HDI and FMLFPR as independent 
variables to compare countries, as development is still a major variable in the political violence 
literature. In terms of country selection, it also removes development as a perturbing third 
variable by selecting a country in which human development does not significantly change over 
the time period studied.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
105 For further discussion on the effect of cultural barriers on improvements in gender equality, see Robert Inglehart 
and Pippa Norris, Rising Tide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
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Prediction Box 
 
 
Spain was chosen for this analysis because its HDI and FMLFPR change differently from 
one another from 1990 to 2017. By choosing a country in which HDI and FMLFPR do not 
change in tandem allows the effects of each variable to be analytically isolated from one another. 
As displayed in the graph below, Spain’s percentile rank for HDI changed only marginally over 
this period of time, while its percentile rank for FMLFPR had one of the largest increases as 
compared to the rest of the world.  
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Unlike some of the other countries that also have different FMLFPR and HDI change 
patterns, Spain’s status as an OECD and more developed country increases the availability of 
data for Spain in particular. This is useful in order to extend the time period studied back to 1980 
and increase the number of observations studied. This consequently increases the degrees of 
freedom for this study which improves the credibility of its results. 
Finally, Spain’s relatively small HDI change during this time period makes it easier to 
isolate the effects of changes in FMLFPR by eliminating major development as a perturbing 
variable that could contribute to a reduction in political violence.  
 
Dependent Variable: Incidents of Political Violence 
 Incidents of violence were derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Although 
this database excludes cases of civil war, it is useful to use in the case of Spain, as the timeframe 
used to analyze Spain (1980-2017) does not include episodes of regime transition or civil war. 
Spain officially became a democracy in June 1977, when it held its first round of free elections 
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following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in 1975. 106 Cases are limited to political 
violence events occurring after 1980, as FMLFPR and HDI data is available only from 1980 
onwards.107  
 Only cases of known domestic political violence were included in the count of incidents 
of political violence. This means that acts carried out by transnational groups were not included 
in the count, as the focus of this study is only on domestic political violence. Furthermore, cases 
in which the identity of the perpetrator is unknown were not included either, as including such 
groups could possibly assign analytical significance to non-domestic groups. Finally, incidents of 
political violence were chosen rather than casualty counts as casualty counts indicate outcome 
rather than intent, which is the focus of this research. 
 
Country Analysis: Spain 
  Spain’s FMLFPR and HDI data is divided into time period intervals of five and ten years 
from 1980-2017. Both five- and ten-year intervals are used as a measure of sensitivity analysis. 
For further sensitivity analysis and to test for potential lag effects these five- and ten-year 
intervals are subject to a five-year lag of both FMLFPR and HDI. Percentile changes are 
included alongside raw data changes in the findings tables to illustrate the extent to which Spain 
changed relative to the rest of the world.108  
                                                 
106 Pamela Beth Radcliff, Modern Spain: 1808 to the Present, (Hoboken & Chichester: John Wily & Sons, 
Incorporated, 2017): 256-258 
107 During the country selection process analysis was limited to the years 1990-2017 due to data availability. In the 
case of Spain specifically, however, data can be expanded backwards one decade using country-specific measures of 
FMLFPR calculated using OECD data. Additionally, HDI values from 1980 and 1985 for Spain were found in older 
UNDP reports. Such an expansion of data cannot be applied on a global level, particularly in the case of FMLFPR, 
as the OECD only reports data for OECD member countries.  
108 The purpose of this is to further emphasize the degree to which Spain’s FMLFPR improved over the 27-year 
period, and how little Spain’s HDI changed during the same time.  
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Available FMLFPR data in the World Bank database is limited to the years 1990-2017. 
Additional FMLFPR data for 1980-1989 is obtained and calculated using OECD data.109 
Extending the data availability by 10 years will increase the number of observations for this 
country.  
 This preliminary data analysis will broadly reveal whether the findings expected by this 
theory hold in the case of Spain. Further qualitative analysis and process tracing will provide a 
more detailed understanding of whether women’s economic empowerment in Spain has a 
plausible causal effect on Spanish political violence from 1980-2017. It will also account for any 
perturbing variables that may affect the changes in political violence.  
 
Findings 
 The first part of this section lays out the data analysis results for Spain in terms of 
FMLFPR and HDI, 1980-2017. The second part of the analysis provides a historical background 
on the lifespan of Spain’s main terrorist group, ETA, Spain’s economic modernization, and 
women’s economic empowerment. Finally, there will be an empirical discussion of evidence that 
could causally link women’s economic empowerment and political violence in the case of Spain.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 The OECD provides data on male and female labor force participation, which is then divided and multiplied 
using the same calculation carried out by the World Bank. Interestingly, the FMLFPR data values slightly differ 
between those provided by the OECD and the World Bank (differences range from 1-5%). For consistency purposes 
the World Bank Data is used from 1990 onwards, as that is the data that was used to select Spain from other 
countries.   
 Walker 31 
Table 1. Raw FMLFPR and HDI Scores, 1980 and 2017 
Year FMLFPR (Raw)110 HDI (Raw) 111 
1980 38.078 0.702 
2017 81.770 0.890 
 
Table 2. Changes in FMLFPR and HDI Values Across Intervals, and Corresponding Changes in 
Incidents of Political Violence 
Interval FMLFPR 
Change 
(%, Raw) 
FMLFPR 
Rank 
Change 
(%) 
HDI 
Change 
(Raw) 
HDI Rank 
Change 
(%) 
Incidents of 
Domestic 
Political 
Violence 
Change 
Incidents of 
Political 
Violence112 
(Raw) 
1980-1984 2.80 N/A 0.018  N/A -26  1980: 137 
1984: 111 
1985-1989 9.05  N/A 0.03  N/A 34  1985: 93 
1989: 127 
1990-1994 5.70  +5 0.04  +2 -70  1990: 104 
1994: 34 
1995-1999 2.85  0  0.02  0  -28  1995: 33 
1999: 5 
2000-2004 4.83  +3 0.01  -2  -50  2000: 70 
2004: 20 
2005-2009 7.32  +13 0.02  0  -4  2005: 19 
2009: 15 
2010-2014 4.04  +7 0.01  +1 3  2010: 1 
2014: 4 
2015-2017 0.91  +2  0  0  -1  2015: 1 
2017: 0 
 
1980-1989 12.66 N/A 0.05  N/A -10  1980: 137 
1989: 127 
1990-1999 9.97  +6  0.07  +2  -99  1990: 104 
1999: 5 
2000-2009 13.36  +17 0.03  -3  -55  2000: 70 
2009: 15 
2010-2017 5.19  +10 0.02  +1  -1 2010: 1 
2017: 0 
*Note: Data for FMLFPR for the years 1980-1989 was calculated using OECD, rather than World Bank, data as the latter does not provide 
FMLFPR data prior to 1990.113 
                                                 
110 All FMLFPR data accessed at: “Ratio of Female to Male Labor Force Participation Rate (%) (Modeled ILO 
Estimate),” The World Bank, Accessed April 27, 2019, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sl.tlf.cact.fm.zs 
111 All HDI data accessed at: “Human Development Data (1990-2017),” United Nations Development Programme: 
Human Development Reports, Accessed April 29, 2019, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
112 All incidents of domestic political violence accessed at: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database [Spain], 2018, Retrieved from 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
113 “LFS by sex and age – indicators,” OECD.Stat, Accessed April 27, 2019, 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R# 
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Table 3. Changes in FMLFPR and HDI Values Across Intervals, and Corresponding Changes in 
Incidents of Political Violence, with a Five-Year Lag 
Interval FMLFPR 
Change (Raw) 
– Five Year 
Lag 
FMLFPR 
Rank Change 
(%) – Five 
Year Lag 
HDI Change 
(Raw) – Five 
Year Lag 
HDI Rank 
Change (%) – 
Five Year Lag 
Incidents of 
Domestic 
Political 
Violence 
Change 
Incidents 
of 
Political 
Violence 
(Raw) 
1980-1984 N/A N/A N/A N/A -26  1980: 137 
1984: 111 
1985-1989 2.80 N/A N/A N/A 34  1985: 93 
1989: 127 
1990-1994 9.05 N/A 0.03 N/A -70  1990: 104 
1994: 34 
1995-1999 5.70 +5 0.04 +2 -28  1995: 33 
1999: 5 
2000-2004 2.85 0 0.02 0 -50  2000: 70 
2004: 20 
2005-2009 4.83 +3 0.01 -2 -4  2005: 19 
2009: 15 
2010-2014 7.32 +13 0.02 0 3  2010: 1 
2014: 4 
2015-2017 3.00 +4 0 0 -1  2015: 1 
2017: 0 
 
1980-1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A -10  1980: 137 
1989: 127 
1990-1999 14.12 N/A 0.72 N/A -99  1990: 104 
1999: 5 
2000-2009 9.32 +6 0.04 -2 -55  2000: 70 
2009: 15 
2010-2017 11.78 +19 0.03 +1 -1 2010: 1 
2017: 0 
 
 Overall, initial findings show a negative relationship between FMLFPR and incidents of 
political violence. The significant exception to this case is seen between 1985-1989 in which 
there was a 27% increase in political violence.114 115 When looked at in the context of a ten-year 
interval (1980-1989), however, there is a net reduction in incidents of political violence by 
7%.116  
                                                 
114 Percent increase is calculated using the following equation: ((127-93)/127)*100 
115 There is also an exception from 2010-2014. This exception, however, is not significant as levels of political 
violence in 2010 were already so low that an increase to a total of four political violence incidents in 2014 does not 
represent a real increase in political violence.  
116 Percent decrease is calculated using the following equation: ((127-137)/127)*100 
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Based on the data the most significant period of decline in political violence occurred 
during the 1990s and 2000s, particularly from 1990-2005. Simultaneously, Spain’s largest 
increase in FMLFPR occurred from 1990-2009.   
Though these overall findings support the predicted negative relationship between 
FMLFPR and political violence, they do not indicate causality. They, therefore, need to be 
historically contextualized in order to determine exactly how the two variables of interest, 
women’s economic empowerment (measured as FMLFPR) and political violence relate to one 
another in the case of Spain.  
 
Historical Background 
Political Violence 
Unlike most of Western Europe Spain did not democratize until 1977. Prior to that it had 
undergone an almost 40-year dictatorship under Francisco Franco, who took power following a 
bloody civil war in the late 1930's. Using harsh and repressive measures Franco united Spain 
under his rule and brutally enforced the creation of a nationalist Spanish identity, known as 
National Catholicism.117 Franco sought to unify the Spanish state under one identity and religion. 
On top of violent repression his methods included a broader strategy of cultural indoctrination. 
Education curriculums were changed to include mandatory observation of Catholicism and use 
of the Spanish-Castilian language for all students.118 The values of family, nation, and 
Catholicism were heavily emphasized in Spanish media and film. All of this was part of Franco’s 
objective to return to what he saw as ‘authentic Spanish roots.’119 
                                                 
117 Cameron J. Watson, Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual Origins of 
ETA, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007): 168.  
118 Watson, 171.  
119 Ibid.  
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In a country composed of many cultural groups this created high levels of animosity and 
dissent. In 1941 the Francoist regime outlawed the use of ‘dialects,’ such as Catalan and Basque 
and obligated the use of Castilian first names.120 Anyone found using or teaching non-Castilian 
culture or language was imprisoned or killed. Many parents refused to teach their children other 
traditional languages or non-Castilian cultures out of fear of retribution. The memory of violence 
and a desire for peace led to submissive attitudes among the older generation.121  
It is this behavior that later led to backlash among the younger generation, particularly in 
the Basque Country, against what they saw as cowardly acquiescence to the Spanish 
government.122 This was combined with a growing disillusionment with the Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (PNV), or Basque Nationalist Party, which was seen as weak and incapable of protecting 
Basque identity by many nationalist groups in the Basque country.123  
The behavior of the Basques was also influenced by their particularly violent relationship 
with the Franco regime. Although the Spanish Civil War ended in 1939 fighting continued in the 
Basque region for several years. This ultimately led Franco to use especially severe and brutal 
tactics in the Basque region to maintain control.124  
It was in this repressive and humiliating context that a new form of Basque nationalism 
emerged. In the early 1950s a group of urban, upper-middle class Basque students began to meet 
to learn about Basque history and culture and later disseminate to the public what they had 
found.125 They soon organized into a formal activist group advocating for a form of Basque 
nationalism that included the creation of completely autonomous and independent Basque 
                                                 
120 Watson, 171.   
121 Watson, 214.  
122 Watson, 175.  
123 Watson, 177, 186.  
124 Ibid. 
125 Watson, 187-188.  
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republic.126 This differed from the stance of the traditional Basque party, the PNV. Rather than 
demanding complete separation from the Spanish state, the PNV felt that agreeing to be part of 
Spain while pushing for a degree of autonomy was the optimal choice for the Basques.127  
This small group of students ultimately became Spain’s most notorious and active 
terrorist group, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), or Basque Homeland and Freedom. From 1990-
2017 ETA carried out 1445 of the 1747 incidents of domestic political violence (or 83%).128 As 
such this thesis will focus on this Basque group, given that it is by far the greatest perpetrator of 
political violence in Spain.  
 ETA was initially founded in 1959 as a cultural movement.129 The main goal of the group 
was to push for the creation of a completely autonomous Basque state, and more broadly, the 
preservation of Basque language and culture.130 To the founders of ETA the Basque language 
represented Basque culture and identity; its gradual disappearance under Franco was interpreted 
as the gradual demise of Basque culture as a whole.131 This belief led to an organizational 
tactical transformation in 1968, a decision influenced in party by other national liberation 
movements taking place at the time in Algeria, Vietnam, and Cuba.132 From that point on ETA 
used violence as a means to achieve its political objectives.133 Counterintuitively, ETA’s 
violence dramatically escalated during the years of democratic transition. This can be attributed 
                                                 
126 Watson, 187-188.  
127 Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984): 25-
26. See also Mercè Ibarz, Breau Historia d’ETA 1959-1979, (Barcelona: Ediciones la Magrana, 1981): 44.  
128 This total only refers to cases in which the identity of the perpetrator group is known.  
129 Carrie Hamilton, “The Gender Politics of Political Violence: Women Armed Activists in ETA,” Feminist Review, 
86 (2007): 132-148 at 134; Fernando Reinares, “Who are the terrorists? Analyzing Changes in Sociological Profile 
Among Members of ETA,” Studies in Conflict Terrorism, 27, (2004): 465-488 at 466.  
130 Teresa Whitfield, Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country, (Oxford University Press, Inc., 
2014): 24-25.  
131 Joseb Zulaika, ETAren hautsa, (Irun: Alberdania, 2006): 100. 
132 Watson, 215, 222; Hamilton (2007a), 134.  
133 Watson, 222.  
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to the group’s dissatisfaction with how the issue of Basque autonomy was handled during the 
democratic negotiations, as well as intense levels of police repression throughout the decade.134 
 ETA is no longer active today. In 2011 ETA declared a permanent ceasefire following 
the agreements made at the internationally-coordinated Aiete Conference. This was the last of 
many attempts at peace negotiations that had occurred since the beginning of the 1990s, all of 
which failed due to the inability of the Spanish government and ETA to reach a compromise on 
the issue of Basque sovereignty. In exchange for a ceasefire, ETA demanded that the Spanish 
government free or reduce the sentences of ETA prisoners and legalize the formation of a new 
Basque nationalist political party, Surtu.135 At this point, ETA was severely weakened due to 
increased policing and arrests during the second half of the 2000s as well as internal divisions 
and loss of political support.136 
The peace process halted, however, when a new political party under Mariano Rajoy took 
power in 2011. Though the Rajoy government legalized Sortu as a political party, they also 
demanded ETA’s unconditional dissolution and refused to demonstrate flexibility concerning 
ETA prisoners.137 The Rajoy government’s refusal to work with ETA was due to growing 
political pressures from the Spanish political right and victims’ organizations who saw such 
action as a form of concession.138 ETA, however, continued its disarmament process. In 2015 the 
Basque parliament proposed that ETA’s disarmament be supervised by an independent 
                                                 
134 Hamilton (2007a), 136; Belzunce F. Letamendia, Historia del nacionalismo vasco y de E.T.A. Vols 1 and 2, (San 
Sebastian: R&B Ediciones, 1994).  
135 In 2002 the Spanish government banned Herri Batasuna, the political party that historically supported ETA. As a 
result, ETA lost much of its financial and operational capacity. The newly proposed party, Sortu, would uphold 
ETA’s political objectives while condemning the use of violence.; Teresa Whitfield, “The Basque Conflict and 
ETA: The Difficulties of an Ending,” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 384, (December 2015): 1-16.  
136 Whitfield (2015), 8 
137 Whitfield (2015), 10.  
138 Ibid.  
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international commission. The Spanish government rejected this proposal and continued to make 
arrests.139 By 2017 ETA was fully disarmed.140 
What was the role of women in reaching this peace over the course of the studied years? 
From the time ETA’s violence reached its peak in 1980 to its disappearance in 2011 the number 
of working women in Spain increased significantly, as did the overall status of women in Spain. 
Whether this contributed to the decrease in ETA’s activities will be determined in the following 
sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Whitfield (2015), 11.  
140 BBC, “Timeline: ETA Campaign,” BBC News, 8 April 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
11181982 
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Table 4. Number of Domestic Political Violence Incidents Committed By ETA, 1980-2017 141 
Year (5-year 
intervals) 
Incidents of Political 
Violence Committed by ETA 
% of Total Incidents of Political 
Violence Committed by ETA 
1980-1984 1980: 118 
1981: 63 
1982: 110 
1983: 88 
1984: 74 
1980: 86% 
1981: 78% 
1982: 89& 
1983: 91% 
1984: 67% 
Total: 453 Total: 82% 
1985-1989 1985: 85 
1986: 93 
1987: 57 
1988: 81 
1989: 117 
1985: 91% 
1986: 93% 
1987: 70% 
1988: 60% 
1989: 92% 
Total: 433 Total: 81% 
1990-1994 1990: 75 
1991: 64 
1992: 37 
1993: Data Unavailable 
1994: 32 
1990: 72% 
1991: 90% 
1992: 70% 
1993: Data Unavailable 
1994: 94% 
Total: 208 Total: 79% 
1995-1999 1995: 30 
1996: 41 
1997: 40 
1998: 9 
1999: 3 
1995: 91% 
1996: 100% 
1997: 98% 
1998: 82% 
1999: 60% 
Total: 123 Total: 94% 
2000-2004 2000: 46 
2001: 35 
2002: 27 
2003: 11 
2004: 20 
2000: 66% 
2001: 100% 
2002: 93% 
2003: 100% 
2004: 100% 
Total: 139 Total: 84% 
2005-2009 2005: 19 
2006: 17 
2007: 4 
2008: 32 
2009: 14 
2005: 100% 
2006: 100% 
2007: 80% 
2008: 100% 
2009: 93% 
Total: 86 Total: 98% 
2010-2014 2010: 1 
2011: 0 
2012: 0  
2013: 0  
2014: 0 
2010: 100% 
2011: 0% 
2012: 0% 
2013: 0% 
2014: 0% 
Total: 1 Total: 9% 
2015-2017 2015: 0 
2016: 0 
2017: 0 
2015: 0% 
2016: 0% 
2017: 0% 
Total: 0 Total: 0% 
*Note: Missing data in 1993 due to a data loss that occurred as the GTD database was transitioning from a paper to an electronic system. 
                                                 
141 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism 
Database [Spain], 2018, Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd  
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Modernization and Women’s Economic Empowerment 
 One of Franco’s goals was the economic modernization of Spain.142 Initially, the 
modernization model centered around economic self-sufficiency in which the Francoist regime 
pursued a policy of import-substitution industrialization.143 Much of this process was carried out 
at the expense of the Spanish lower class, in an effort by Franco to further consolidate his power 
and exert control over the Spanish people.144 Yet by the 1950s it was apparent that these policies 
were failing to meet the industrialization goals of the regime. Francoist officials realized that in 
order to modernize the Spanish economy they would have to implement liberalization reforms 
that more closely aligned with the international economic order.  
 The Stabilization Plan of 1959 marked the beginning of Spanish economic 
liberalization.145 The implemented policies transitioned Spain from an agrarian to an industrial 
and service economy, marking the beginning of what later became known as Spain’s ‘economic 
miracle.’146 Spain’s GDP doubled from 1960 to 1975, and by the early 1970s Spain’s GDP per 
capita elevated it to the world’s eighth largest economy.147 This growth was in large part due to 
increased foreign direct investment, tourism, and remittances from Spanish migrants working 
abroad.148 
Thus, by the time Spain democratized in 1977, much of Spain’s economic development 
had already taken place. Abrupt or large changes in development that may be associated with 
                                                 
142 Watson, 169.  
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid; Michael Richards, “Terror and Progress’: Industrialization, Modernity, and the Making of Francoism,” in 
Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction, ed. Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995): 176.  
145 Radcliff, 232.  
146 Radcliff, 224, 231-232.  
147 Radcliff, 232.  
148 Radcliff, 234; Adrian, Schubert, A Social History of Modern Spain, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 209.  
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outbreaks of political violence, especially those due to relative deprivation or globalization 
grievances, are likely not as applicable in the case of Spain during the time period being studied. 
Although Spain modernized in the 1960s and 1970s, Spain’s female labor force 
participation remained very low. During these years only 17-20% of Spain’s women were 
working in the formal labor force.149 This was largely due to the legacy of Franco’s Catholic 
nationalist policies that legislatively and culturally subordinated women to men, consequently 
relegating them largely to the domestic sphere.150 By comparison, female labor force 
participation in other European countries was as high as 40-50%.151 
At a legislative level, family planning policies such as contraception and abortion were 
outlawed, which severely limited women’s autonomy by removing family planning measures.152 
In 1938 Franco passed a law known as Fuero del Trabajo in which employers were obligated to 
replace their married female employees with male ones.153 Women were also required to secure 
their husband’s permission to work, travel, or own property and were subject to stricter 
definitions concerning crimes such as adultery and desertion than were their husbands.154 
Although in the 1960s legal restrictions on female employment were partially lifted, working 
                                                 
149 “Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of female population ages 15+) (national estimate), The World 
Bank, Accessed April 27, 2019, 
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152 Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, “Social Values and Attitudes” in Spain: A Country Study, Washington: GPO 
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women were still statistically few and largely found in more ‘feminine’ professions such as 
nursing, secretarial work, or primary school education.155  
At a cultural level, a working woman was scorned and considered as low-class, as only a 
woman from a poor family would need to work.156 This reflected Spain’s broader patriarchal 
culture, dubbed as ‘Machismo,’ which maintained the inferiority of women and made it very 
difficult for them to become independent or economically empowered.157  
From 1980 to 2017 FMLFPR in Spain increased from 38.078 to 81.770 (See Table 1). 
Compared to the rest of Europe at the time, however, Spain’s raw female labor force 
participation was relatively well below the EU average until 2008 (see Table 5). This means that 
for the majority of the time period studied in this analysis, Spain’s gender equality (measured as 
female labor force participation) was much lower than its regional average.  
Under Franco’s patriarchal social system, Spanish women did not have the types of 
social, economic, or legal opportunities in which they could imaginably exert influence over 
others in Spanish society. Yet for the next several decades after Spain’s democratization, women 
continued to participate much less in the formal workforce than did men. Patriarchal attitudes 
also continued to persist in Spanish culture, though much less than before.158 As will be 
discussed in the next section, this economic and social disadvantage may have made it difficult 
for women to play a role in reducing political violence in Spain for most of the time period 
studied.  
 
                                                 
155 Hamilton (2007a), 135; Gobierno Vasco, Situacion de la mujer en Euskadi, (Vitoria: Gobierno Vasco, 2007): 
135.   
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Table 5. Spain vs. E.U. Female Labor Force Participation Rates, 1990-2017 159  
 
 
The Nexus: Political Violence and Women’s Economic Empowerment 
A data correlation alone is not sufficient to conclusively support the theory that women’s 
economic empowerment reduces political violence. If women’s economic empowerment does 
reduce political violence by reducing economic grievances and shifting violent cultural norms, 
then there should be evidence pointing to the increasing influence of women within society, and 
in particular, within the groups committing the violence. Moreover, this influence would need to 
be one advocating for non-violent conflict resolution.  
The bulk of violence committed by ETA occurred from 1980-1994, with a total of 1,094 
incidents carried out by the organization during this time (see Table 4). Major reductions in 
ETA’s violence began in 1990 and continued until 2011. In the early 2000s there was a brief 
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upswing in political violence counts before numbers once again went down, this time 
permanently.  
What role did women play in peace processes between ETA and the Spanish 
government? What happened post-1990 that reduced ETA’s violence, and did women play an 
influential role? What happened in the early 2000s that jeopardized the peace process, and how 
was peace ultimately achieved in 2011? Broadly, were Spanish or Basque women in a position to 
exert an influence over Spanish government or ETA's behavior? 
 
The Role of Women Inside ETA 
 Despite the approval of the 1978 Constitution that included the establishment of a fairly 
autonomous Basque province, ETA continued its use of violent tactics to advocate for Basque 
separatism.160 At this time the role of women within ETA was confined to supportive roles such 
as organizational maintenance or information gathering, and this did not significantly change 
over time.161 Women were viewed by ETA as mothers and caregivers, not warriors or fighters.162 
Since its origin ETA’s organizational image was oriented around masculine images of violence, 
which may have made it difficult for any sort of alternative female- or peace-oriented perspective 
to conflict resolution to emerge within the organization. 
Although the percent of female ETA members increased over time, it overall remained 
very small. From 1970 to 1977 women made up 4.2% of ETA members, from 1978-1982 they 
made up 6.4% of ETA members, and from 1983-1995 they made up 11.2% of ETA members.163 
                                                 
160 Reinares, 466.  
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Despite membership growth female numbers were nevertheless very low and likely indicate that 
women had little internal influence over the actions of ETA. This is even more likely given that 
there are only three notable female leaders in ETA’s history, none of whom had a large impact 
on ETA’s decision making.164   
There were several attempts at peace negotiations between ETA and the Spanish 
government from 1980 to 2011, the year in which ETA declared a permanent ceasefire. Overall, 
there was almost no participation by ETA women in the negotiations.165 The few exceptions 
occurred during negotiations that took place from 1986 to 1989 and in 1998.  
ETA and the Spanish government met in Algeria from 1986 to 1989. Apart from Maria 
Belen González Peñalba, one of the ETA representatives, no other women were present at the 
peace talks.166 Although it is unknown exactly what specific role Ms. Peñalba played during 
these talks, ETA ultimately backed out of the negotiations and the corresponding temporary 
ceasefire, as they were not willing to compromise on the issue of complete Basque autonomy.167  
 Ms. Peñalba was also present during the ETA-government negotiations that took place in 
1999 following the signing of the Lizarra-Garazi Accord in 1998.168 Again, she was the only 
                                                 
164 There are only three notable female leaders in ETA’s history. Dolores González Catarain (“Yoyes”) was the first 
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woman present for either side and again, negotiations failed because of the Spanish 
government’s refusal to consider the Basque right of self-determination.169 Though the exact role 
of Ms. Peñalba is unclear, her presence as a woman did not lead to a positive outcome in the 
peace process.170 That said, it should be noted that ETA’s culture as an organization was very 
patriarchal, and that it may be likely that any woman in a leadership role would have had to 
reflect masculine behavior in order to be accepted.171 
On balance the peace processes between the Spanish government and ETA failed, though 
whether this was due to lack of female participation in the negotiations is indeterminate. What 
can be inferred is that the historically low levels of female membership in ETA, the almost-
negligible number of female leaders in ETA, and the minimal participation of ETA women in the 
peace negotiations indicate that any influence women may have had on reducing ETA’s political 
violence would not have been internal to the organization.  
 
The Role of Women in Basque Society 
The majority of working women in Spain from 1975-2005 were employed in services,172 
while the majority of male ETA recruitments from 1970-1995 worked in the industrial sector.173 
Though the time periods do not exactly coincide, the overlap is sufficient to infer that there was 
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little opportunity for Spanish women to exert professional influence over men in a way that may 
have dissuaded them from joining ETA.174  
That said, even though Basque women may not have been able to influence their male 
counterparts in the workplace, the added income to their households may have had a positive 
impact on reducing ETA’s violence. This claim though is less plausible due to lack of empirical 
evidence.   
During Spain’s economic miracle the Basque Country was one of the wealthiest regions 
due to a wave of industrialization that transformed it into a hub for iron and steel firms, 
shipyards, electrical, chemical, and paper industries.175 Consequently, the Basque Country saw a 
huge influx of capital during the 1960s and 1970s.176 This is interesting to note given that it was 
at this time that ETA began to carry out attacks against the Spanish public. That said, when the 
economic crisis of the late 1970s hit the Basque region its unemployment rate doubled relative to 
that of other EU countries.177 The Basque region did not significantly recover until the early 
1990s when it began to diversity its economy and there was a major shift in employment from 
industrial to service sectors.178  
As previously noted, the majority of men in ETA came from the industrial sector. This 
would mean that the Basque unemployment would have more adversely affected men than 
women, who were mostly employed in the services sector. While data on which households were 
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specifically affected by the crisis and whether women in them were employed could not be 
found, it would not be unreasonable to surmise that the rise in female labor force participation in 
Spain may have helped mitigate economic grievances that could have further fueled Basque 
political violence. Additionally, it may have reduced the ability of the public to financial support 
the organization, though there is no data to support this conjecture.  
That said, ETA’s primary objectives were based around the goal of complete Basque 
autonomy and the protection of Basque culture, so it is unlikely that an increased level of 
economic grievance in the Basque country would have increased levels of ETA’s activity 
through this mechanism.  
 What about women’s influence at the community level? Civil society plays an important 
role in shaping public perception and support for particular political groups. Even though Basque 
woman may have had little opportunity to influence the actions of ETA through direct 
involvement in the organization, they may have been able to do so through involvement in civil 
society groups promoting a peaceful resolution to the Basque conflict. As discussed in the theory 
section, economically empowered women increase their involvement and influence in civil 
society and political organizations. The role this influence may have played will be discussed 
subsequently. 
The Ahotsak (“voices”) group was created in the 2000s by female politicians in the 
Basque parliament whose goal was to bring Basque women from across the political spectrum 
together to find a peaceful solution to the Basque conflict.179 The group formed as a response to 
failures of 1990s peace agreements and a desire to move the peace process forward via dialogue.  
                                                 
179 Ana Villellas Ariño, María Villellas Ariño, and Pamela Urrutia Arestizábal, The Experience of Ahotsak: 
Women’s Dialogue Across the Divide in the Basque Country, (London, Democratic Progress Institute: 2018). 
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Ahotsak not only brought together women from various political groups, but from union 
and feminist organizations as well. As a group their goals were to emphasize peace as a demand 
and political priority, as well as the right of Basque citizens to run their own government.180 
Their efforts were shaped by a desire to incorporate gender in to the peace-making process 
following the historic passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, 
Security, and Peace. The group put together a founding text that outlined a peaceful solution to 
the Basque conflict and presented it to the public in December 2006.181 The initiative garnered 
5,000 signatures and a large degree of public support as Ahotsak held many events across the 
Basque country.182 As Ahotsak’s message spread, local groups began to replicate their efforts by 
organizing their own peace initiatives.183  
Ahotsak’s achievements were ultimately cut short when ETA resumed violence in 2007 
after a temporary ceasefire.184 An ETA attack on December 30th, 2006, killed two Ecuadorian 
citizens and created a large obstacle for the peace process.185 Although Ahotsak leaders 
continued pushing for peace, negative political and media pressure regarding the ability of ETA 
to uphold a ceasefire severely curtailed the efforts of the group.186 That said, Ahotsak, along with 
other peace activist groups, helped create the Civil Society Forum in 2013, which met to discuss 
topics such as ETA’s prisoner policies, ETA’s disarmament and the use of negotiations rather 
than violence to solve the Basque conflict without undermining Basque nationalism.187 
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The case of Ahotsak is an example in which peace efforts by Basque women may be 
considered a failure. Though at first the peace process seemed optimistic, the actions of ETA and 
its continued use of violence ruined any prospects for a negotiated peace. As was previously 
discussed, women had little influence within the organization, which refused to accept 
compromise over the issue of Basque sovereignty until they were so weakened that continued 
efforts were unfeasible. By that point, decades of violence and continued violations of ceasefires 
led the Spanish government under President Rajoy to refuse further negotiations with ETA.  
Another notable women’s group is Emakunde, the Basque Institute for Women. It was 
created via legislation in 1988 as a government entity focused on achieving political, economic, 
and social gender equality in the Basque country.188 Their main task is to prepare legislative 
proposals promoting equality, monitor the implementation of existing legislation, issue updates 
on the status of gender equality and similar initiatives.189 One of their biggest roles today is 
ensuring the implementation of the 2005 Basque gender equality law, which requires 50% of 
political party membership to be held by women and a minimum of 40% representation in 
government by each gender.190  
This law drastically changed the composition of Basque politics. As of 2015, there are 31 
women in the Basque parliament and 44 men.191 Separately in 2018, women outnumbered men 
in the prime minister’s cabinet for the first time in history.192 Of important note is the 
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appointment of a Catalan, Meritxell Batet, to the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Civil Service 
(MPTFP), in charge of managing the relationships between Spain’s various regions, particularly 
those with separatist movements.193 While this specific change did not impact the reduction of 
ETA’s violence, as it occurred after the 2011 declaration of ceasefire, it does indicate that gender 
equality and the status of women continues to improve in both the Basque country and in Spain 
at large. It also provides hope for the resolution of historically antagonistic relationships between 
the central Spanish government and certain autonomous regions, such as Catalonia and the 
Basque Country.  
Others have argued that the decline of political violence, especially in the case of ETA, 
has been due to a combination of effective police tactics and widespread acceptance of 
democratic institutions.194 Overtime, the rights and freedoms granting the Basques a high degree 
of political autonomy diminished ETA’s popular support and political legitimacy, as Basque 
citizens saw a democratic path toward achieving their political objectives.195 These 
developments, combined with ETA’s killings of civilians, reduced support for ETA among 
Basque citizens.  
In conclusion, any role women may have had in reducing ETA’s violence would have 
occurred at the household and civil society level, as women had little influence within ETA 
itself. Part of ETA’s demise was the result of loss of public support. In this sense the role of 
women becomes more plausible, as many women were involved in peace activism and 
advocating for a non-violent resolution to the Basque conflict.  
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Conclusion 
The predictions of this study were two-fold. First, as women entered the workforce the 
added income brought to their households would reduce economic grievances that could generate 
political violence. Second, broader improvements in gender equality resulting from women’s 
economic empowerment would generate liberal normative shifts that would reject the use of 
violence.  
 The findings of this study cannot clearly corroborate the first prediction. Though 
increases in female labor force participation did coincide with unemployment in sectors 
dominated by men, it is unclear whether this had an impact on resolving economic grievances. 
What’s more, ETA was an organization primarily driven by political concerns regarding the 
preservation of Basque identity, not a response to economic grievances. Hence, any 
improvements in the well-being of Basque households that could have occurred as a result of 
increased female labor force participation are unlikely to have had an effect on Basque political 
violence.  
 The findings are more optimistic about the second prediction. The increased influence of 
women in civil society and their active participation in promoting peaceful conflict resolution 
may have both encouraged the use of democratic processes to resolve the conflict as well as 
turned public support away from ETA. In this sense, the role of women’s economic 
empowerment in reducing political violence becomes clearer. Though a definitive conclusion is 
impossible, it is likely that if women’s economic empowerment did have an effect on political 
violence it would be through women’s influence on civil society, rather than through a direct 
influence on organized political violence.  
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As was previously discussed, there are three major causes of political violence: economic 
development, political institutions and cultural modernization. By isolating the years studied in 
this thesis from 1980 to 2017, it was possible to avoid major economic development and regime 
change as perturbing variables that could have affected Spanish political violence. What was 
seen in this study, though, was that cultural modernization did play an important role in shifting 
public attitudes and discourse concerning the ways of resolving the Basque conflict. As Spain 
transitioned into a post-industrial economy and consolidated its democracy it saw liberal 
normative shifts in its socio-political culture. These included tangible improvements in the status 
of women as well as improved democratic dialogue between Basques and the Spanish 
government.  
The limitations of this study are found in the lack of more concrete evidence that could be 
used to link women’s economic empowerment to political violence. This is in part due to time 
constraints and resources available for conducting research. For a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between the two variables it would be necessary to find polling data surveying 
varying attitudes pertaining to the role that activist groups such as Ahotsak played in changing 
public discourse regarding the Basque conflict.  
 Additionally, whether the households affected by unemployment were also households 
occupied by ETA members, and whether that condition influenced their decision to join the 
organization, would help better determine whether economic grievances bolstered ETA 
recruitment.   
Finally, only conducting in-depth research into one country presents problems concerning 
the generalizability of the results. Though in the case of Spain women’s involvement in civil 
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society may have helped diminish ETA’s public support, that may not be the case for all 
incidents of domestic political violence.  
Further research should look at how the prevalence of gender violence in a society may 
relate to political violence. A society in which an individual is more likely to use political 
violence to resolve political conflict may also be a society in which individuals are likely to use 
violence more generally to resolve any conflict. It would be interesting to see if there is a 
correlation between gender violence and political violence in a society.  
All in all, the findings of this study suggest that as a society becomes more democratic 
and inclusive, there is a reduction in its people's tolerance for the use of violence as a way to 
resolve grievances. As citizens realize the effectiveness of non-violent democratic mechanisms 
as a means to express grievances and achieve political objectives, they stop supporting the use of 
violence to do the same. By definition and in practice, gender equality is a fundamental and 
necessary stepping stone in a country’s democratic process. Without improving gender equality, 
a country cannot truly be called democratic in the modern context. If gender equality is 
fundamental for democracy, and well-run democratic institutions help reduce political violence, 
then it is safe to say that gender equality is a necessary, though not sufficient, step to ending 
political violence. Perhaps the most important result of this research is to establish the need to 
further examine the foundational role gender equity plays in democratization and its 
corresponding influence on reducing political violence.   
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